May 20, 2008

Don't trust our elections to machines

Guest Opinion

By Fred Foldvary

California should replace all voting machines and scannable forms with papers ballots, hand-counted in each precinct.

The problem with computerized voting is that it is an opaque box whose inner operations are unobservable. Hackers can tamper with the programming and with the data, and there is no way to be sure that the tallied voting totals are genuine. A printed record of each vote is better than nothing, but doing a recount with the printed records is costly. And if the recount is itself done with computerized data processing, we are back to square one.

With the use of punched cards or scannable forms, most elections will not be recounted. If the votes for a candidate or proposition are not closely tied, it is unlikely that one side will demand a recount.

Under the current system, mail-in ballots of absentee voters are hand-marked but computer-counted. Again, the data processing can be tampered with. Any time a machine tallies a total, the sums are subject to doubt. There is no way to fix this situation. A machine or computer program can be tested and certified to be correct at one time and then subsequently hacked to produce a manipulated result. Similarly, programming can be set to switch on at a particular time so that a prior test gives a correct answer but in the actual voting the secret code kicks in to skew the outcome.

The alternative to computerized voting is to hand-count paper ballots. This can be done by volunteers in each voting precinct. Each proposition and government position would have to have its own paper ballot. Observers would watch the voters put the ballots into several boxes. For example, there would be one box for the presidential election, another for the senate election and so on.

After the polls close, volunteers would hand count the ballots for each box. In computing, this is called "parallel processing." The task is decentralized into small parts processed simultaneously, and then the results are combined.

Two volunteers would be needed to count each box, and observers would monitor the volunteers. A large hall such as a school gymnasium could be used for simultaneous counting of all the boxes.

After the precinct votes have been counted, the ballots and totals would be delivered to the county seat. There, the results from the precincts would be added up, by hand, with volunteers watching the process. The county totals could then be sent to a state ballot counting center organized by the secretary of state.

The main cost of this process would be printing of the ballots, which should be cheaper than the cost of voting machines and the labor involved in handling the machines. If there are enough volunteers, labor costs would be low.

In the larger elections, many volunteers and a large space would be needed to hand count the votes for the numerous candidates and issues we have in California. Still, hand counting can be done effectively by dividing the ballots into categories, such as state propositions, local propositions, federal and state offices and local offices. Paper ballots would be placed in these four boxes, and after the voting is over, the ballots in each box could be sorted into boxes for each ballot measure or office and then counted.

If we want to minimize election fraud and computer glitches, we need to completely eliminate automation and have human intelligence count the ballots in a visible process. Otherwise, democracy itself will be in danger of collapse as voters will increasingly question whether their votes count or whether those who do the counting are really in charge.



Fred E. Foldvary teaches economics at Santa Clara University, where he is also an associate of the Civil Society Institute. His main areas of research include public finance, public choice, social ethics and the economics of real estate.